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Groat: Groat: Arbitration Agreements:

Arbitration Agreements: Should a
Union Be Allowed to Make
Collective Bargaining Agreements
That Bind Individuals' Federal
Statutory Claims to Arbitration?
Brisentine v. Stone & Webster EngineeringCorp.

I. INTRODUCTION
With the constant increase of employment litigation2 among individuals, unions
and companies, the use of arbitration clauses continues to grow each day. While it
is clear that arbitration clauses can be beneficial, it is not clear when and in what
situations they should be binding, and hence, waive the rights of parties to have their
day in court. Against this backdrop, the Brisentine court faced the issue of whether
a union, when making a collective bargaining agreement, can bind individual
employee's federal statutory rights to arbitration.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Clifford Brisentine ("Brisentine") brought suit in an Alabama District Court
alleging Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation ("Stone") violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by terminating his employment.'
Mr. Brisentine, an electrician, injured his back at work when he fell off
scaffolding.4 He later underwent surgery and a "work hardening" rehabilitation
process.' After completing rehabilitation,6 he was referred by his union for
employment with Stone.7 Upon referral, he became a probationary employee falling

1. 117 F.3d 519 (11 th Cir. 1997).
2. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
3. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 519.
4. Id.at 521.
5. Id.
6. Id. After rehabilitation his doctor released him, but he set lifting restrictions of 30 to 45 pounds
and restricted repetitive stooping and bending. Id.
7. Id. Employment at Stone & Webster is a two-step process. The first step is satisfied when a
union refers a worker to the company. Upon referral, the worker is classified as a "probationary
employee." Id. These employees have the same rights and liabilities as regular employees. Id. The
second step is the employee must complete an application and qualify according to the job
specifications. A person who meets step one but fails step two is deemed "terminated" according to the
language of the Agreement. Id.
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under Stone's Project Maintenance and Modification Agreement
Under this
collective bargaining agreement, Mr. Brisentine was then required to complete a
formal application.' In this application for employment, Mr. Brisentine disclosed his
lifting, stooping and bending restrictions.1 0 Later that day, he was informed by a
labor relations manager at Stone that his application was being rejected, terminating
his employment due to his disability." Mr. Brisentine contacted his union
representative to file a grievance according to the terms of the agreement. 2 The
representative recommended that due to the nature of the dismissal, Mr. Brisentine
should file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") instead of pursuing the grievance procedure. 3 Thus, instead of filing a
grievance, Mr. Brisentine filed his complaint with the EEOC. He claimed that Stone
violated the ADA 4 by terminating him because of his disability and failing to make
a reasonable accommodation for it.' 5 After receiving his authorization letter from
the EEOC, Mr. Brisentine filed this lawsuit in federal court. 6
Stone moved for summary judgment claiming Brisentine was required,
according to the agreement, 7 to file a grievance and submit it for binding
arbitration.'" The district court granted the summary judgment holding that
Brisentine's federal statutory claim "was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to [the] arbitration clause in [the] collective bargaining agreement."' 9 Brisentine
then filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.20
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court.2' It held that the mandatory
arbitration clause of the agreement did not bar Mr. Brisentine from litigation of the
ADA federal statutory claim because he did not individually agree to the contract

8. Id. This collective bargaining agreement is between Tennessee Valley Authority contractors and
subcontractors and the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council unions. Id.at 519-520. It is "binding
upon and effective in determining the relations between the parties." Id.It requires the contractor, Stone,
to recognize the union as the exclusive and sole bargaining representative for all craft workers of the
contractor. Id. Additionally, it does not permit the union or the contractor to discriminate against any
applicant or employee for employment because of creed, race, sex, color, age, national origin, or
handicap; however, this agreement does not explicitly address the arbitration of federal statutory claims.
Id.Finally, while it establishes a procedure for grievances where an employee can protest a suspension,
termination, or specific provisional violation of this agreement, it does not provide the employee with
the right to arbitration. Id. Instead, it states, "[a]lthough the individual employee must initiate the
grievance procedure, if a settlement is not reached within the first few steps of the grievance procedure,
only the Council and the Contractor have the authority to appeal an unfavorable resolution of a grievance
to an arbitrator." 1d.
9. Id. at 521.
10. Id.
11. Id.12. Id. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. §1201-12213 (1990). § 12101(b)(1) states, "It is the purpose of this chapter to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."
15. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 521.
16. Id.
17. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
18. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 521.
19. Id. at 519.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 526.
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with the arbitration clause, the agreement did not explicitly authorize arbitration as
a means of resolving federal statutory claims, and the agreement did not give him
the right to demand arbitration if the ADA claim was not resolved to his
satisfaction. 2

III. LEGAL HISTORY
In 1957, the Supreme Court held that the federal district courts, according to
the Taft-Hartley Act, had the power to enforce arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. 3 Following their previous practices, labor unions continued
to benefit from the cost effectiveness and timeliness of binding arbitration clauses,
and the Supreme Court, in the "Steelworkers Trilogy," continued to support these
clauses. 24 With the successful enforcement of these clauses, they began to appear in
employee handbooks, contracts, manuals and employment applications in an attempt
to control state and federal anti-discrimination disputes.25
A. The Development of the Collective BargainingPrecedent
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether an employee had the statutory right to proceed to trial under a Title VII
claim after he had voluntarily submitted his claim to arbitration under a
nondiscrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement.26 In Alexander, Mr.
Alexander, a black employee, was fired by Gardner-Denver Company.27 He claimed
his dismissal was due to discrimination and filed a grievance with the union.2" The
collective bargaining agreement had a broad arbitration clause that outlined a fourstep grievance procedure for covering disputes rising out of employment.29
Ultimately, if the dispute was not settled, it was to be submitted to compulsory
arbitration.3° Such arbitration was to be final and binding upon all parties.31

22. Id.
23. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This was the
first Supreme Court decision to endorse the use of predispute arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements.
24. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These three decisions were rendered
on the same day and dealt with the source of arbitral authority, the presumption of arbitrability, and the
arbitrator's right to award remedies.
25. See Loren K. Allison and Eric H. J. Stahlut, Arbitrationand the ADA: Do the Two Make Strange
Bedfellows?, 37 RES GESTAE 168, 168 (1993).
26. 415 U.S. 36(1974).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. The collective bargaining agreement allowed the company to "hire, suspend or discharge
(employees) for proper cause." Id. It also stated "there shall be no discrimination against any employee
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry." Id.
30. Id. at 41.
31. Id. at 42.
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The Supreme Court reasoned that Title VII was created to be an additional
statutory remedy for individuals to pursue their rights against discrimination.3 2 Thus,
choosing to submit a dispute to arbitration only bound Mr. Alexander's contractual
rights, not his statutory rights.33 The Court held Mr. Alexander should be permitted
to pursue both the collective bargaining grievance procedure and the Title VII
statutory claim. 4 In concluding this, the Court expressed its concern that arbitrators
are not qualified to decide statutory matters. 5 After this decision, the lower courts
typically allowed employees to file suits pertaining to civil rights and statutory
claims regardless of the collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate.3 6 However,
there was enough confusion that the Supreme Court continued to accept questions
pertaining to the expansion of this precedent.37
In Barrentinev. Arkansas-Best FreightSystems, Inc., the Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of whether drivers who were not compensated for time spent
inspecting and transporting failing trucks could file suit without being bound by the
collective bargaining grievance procedure.38 The Court allowed the employees to
avoid the collective bargaining grievance procedures and file suit against their
employer for violating the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.3 9 Likewise, in McDonaldv. City of West Branch, the Supreme Court focused
on the issue of whether a discharged police officer who lost in arbitration should be
precluded from then bringing a § 1983 court action.4 ° The Court held that a decision
by an arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement would not qualify
under § 1983 allowing a collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. 41
B. The Development of the Commercial Context Precedent
Although the precedent pertaining to the arbitration of statutory rights under
collective bargaining agreements seemed mostly settled, in the mid-eighties, a
contrary line of precedent began to emerge on the arbitration horizon.42 In
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether an automobile dealer's counter-claims of antitrust
and unfair competition against an international manufacturer had to be arbitrated.43
The Court held that the collective bargaining line of reasoning did not control
commercial disputes."4 Instead, it adopted the court of appeals' two-step test.45 First,

32. Id. at 47.
33. Id. at 52.
34. Id. at 59-60.
35. Id. at 57. See discussion infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1986);
Criswell v. Western Airlines, 709 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1983).
37. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
38. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
39. Id.
40. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
41. Id.
42. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
43. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 628.
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the court should determine "whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the
statutory issues, and then, upon finding it did, consider whether legal constraints
external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. '" Using
this test, the Supreme Court determined that the parties did agree to arbitrate
statutory issues and that the Federal Arbitration and Sherman Acts did not render
antitrust claims nonarbitrable 7
In Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court expanded
this line of cases. 48 The Court focused on the issue of whether customers of a
brokerage firm whose agreements provided for arbitration must arbitrate claims of
RICO 49 violations and securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.50
In applying the two-part test, it endorsed the use of arbitration as pertaining to
securities51 and RICO. 2 In Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/AmericanExpress,
Inc., the Supreme Court again added to this line of precedent. 3 The Court
considered the issue of whether securities investors pursuant to an agreement of
arbitration with a brokerage firm must arbitrate alleged violations of the Securities
Act of 1933. 4 In determining that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
governed by the Securities Act of 1993 was enforceable, the Supreme Court upheld
McMahon."
C. The Two Lines ofArbitration PrecedentMeet
In 1991, the Supreme Court was confronted with these two lines of precedent
in Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp.6 The issue was whether a claim
governed by the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 57 could "be

46. Id.
47. Id. at 628. Additionally the Court stated:
[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. We must assume that if Congress
intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative
history.
Id.
48. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
49. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961
50. Id.
51. This "claim was brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)." Id. at 222.
52. Id.
53. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 485. This decision overruled Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which refused to
allow arbitration of disputes arising under the Securities Act of 1933. Additionally, Wilko was the case
that Alexander relied heavily on in making its decision that arbitrators were not qualified to handle
certain complex matters.
56. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
57. 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621.
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subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a
securities registration application. '8
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) employed Gilmer as a
Financial Services Manager.5 9 Gilmer, then as required by Interstate, register ed with
several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") as a
securities representative.60 This application stipulated that Gilmer would arbitrate
"any dispute" pertaining to this agreement under the by-laws, rules, or constitutions
of the organizations with which he registers.61 After being terminated at the age of
62, Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and filed suit charging violation of the ADEA 2
63
Interstate, relying on the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and the arbitration
agreement of the application, filed a motion to compel Gilmer to arbitrate the
claim.' The district court, citing Alexander, denied the motion. 65 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or
underlying purposes of the ADEA indicat[ed] a congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements." 66 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit because "Gilmer ha[d] not met his burden of showing that Congress, when
Act., 67
enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that
Additionally, the Court discussed the difference in the two lines of cases and their
application.68
In the aftermath of Gilmer, there was a split among the circuit courts in
determining whether to apply Gilmer or Alexander to collective bargaining

58. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. id.
63. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
65. Id. The Court stated that "Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from waiver of a
judicial forum. Id.
66. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
67. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
68. Id. The Court stated:
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of
contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the
employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, the labor arbitrators were
not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held
not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases
occurred in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants there were
represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore
was the tension between collective representative and individual statutory rights, a concern
not applicable to the present case. Finally, these cases were not decided under the FAA,
which as discussed above, reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.
Id. at 35 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
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agreements. 69 The Second,70 Seventh, 7' Eighth, 72 and Tenth Circuits 73 applied
Alexander to collective bargaining agreements. However, the Third,74 and Fourth7 5
Circuits applied Gilmer to collective bargaining agreements. While the decisions of
many circuits are yet to be determined, the Eleventh Circuit was the most recent to
cast its vote in an attempt to clarify this confusion.76

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Brisentine,the Eleventh Circuit faced the issue of whether an ADA statutory
claim was "subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement."77 The court noted that this area of law is
addressed by two Supreme Court decisions, neither being directly on point, which
reached different conclusions.7
The Eleventh Circuit found that Gilmer
distinguished but did not overrule Alexander.79 Therefore, the court determined it
should look at the distinctions of the cases to decide which Brisentine more closely
resembled.80
First, the Brisentine court stated that Alexander "involved an agreement to
arbitrate contractual claims that did not extend to statutory claims.""' In Gilmer,
however, the arbitration agreement covered both statutory and contractual claims.82
Additionally, the Brisentine court found the provisions in the agreement stating the
authority of the arbitrator over the grievance procedure were practically identical to
Alexander's agreement.83 Therefore, the court determined that the instant case more
closely resembled Alexander than Gilmer.84
The court stated that the second distinction pertained to the nature of the
agreements being individual versus collective. 85 It noted Gilmer dealt with individual
agreements while Alexander focused on collective bargaining agreements. 86 It

69. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
70. Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 1995).
71. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 957 F.2d 424 (7th
Cir. 1992).
72. Vamer v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
73. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Ryan v. City of Shawnee, 13
F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
74. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
75. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 1997). This opinion was removed from the bound
volume after rehearing en banc was granted, and the opinion was vacated July 1, 1997.
76. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 519.
77. Id. at 520.
78. Id. at 521.
79. Id. at 523.
80. Id.
81. Id.; See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 524.
83. Id.
84. id. at 523-24.
85. Id. at 524.
86. Id. at 524-25.
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reasoned this was important because with collective bargaining agreements, the
union represents employee-claimants in arbitration proceedings which may result in
disparity of interests between an employee and union regarding prosecution of
employee's individual statutory rights. 7 Furthermore, unlike individual employment
contracts, this disparity of interests in collective bargaining agreements weighed
against enforcement of arbitration clauses as the worker's exclusive remedy for
individual statutory rights.8" The instant case dealt with an employee under a
collective bargaining agreement; therefore, the court concluded that Brisentine
resembled Alexander for the second distinction. 9
The court stated that the third important distinction between Gilmer and
Alexander was whether the claim arose under the FAA. 90 Gilmer arose out of an
FAA claim, whereas Alexander did not.9' It reasoned this was important because one
of the reasons Gilmer enforced the arbitration clause as to individual statutory rights
was the FAA's liberal policy for favoring arbitration agreements. 92 Again, the court
found that the instant case was more similar to Alexander than Gilmer since
Brisentine dealt with an ADA, not an FAA claim. 93 Considering all three
distinctions, the court determined that the instant case was more
94 like Alexander than
Gilmer; thus, the court followed the precedent of Alexander.
Following the Alexander precedent, the court looked to three factors in deciding
Brisentine.9' First, the court considered whether Mr. Brisentine individually agreed
to the contract with the arbitration clause.9 Concluding that he did not individually
agree to the contract with the arbitration clause, the court stated that the union
agreeing for workers during collective bargaining would not count. 97 Second, the
court considered whether the agreement authorized the arbitrator to decide federal
statutory claims. 9 It concluded that the Brisentine agreement did not authorize the
arbitrator to decide federal statutory claims. The court also stated that it is not
sufficient that an arbitrator can decide contract claims, even when factual issues from
these claims overlap with statutory claim issues. 99 Third, the court considered
whether the agreement gave Mr. Brisentine the right to demand arbitration if the
grievance process did not resolve to his satisfaction the federal statutory claim.1 °
The court concluded that agreement did not provide Mr. Brisentine with "the right
to insist on arbitration if the federal statutory claim [was] not resolved to his
satisfaction."10' From this, the court concluded that none of the three factors were

87. Id.at525
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.at521.
94. Id.at525.
95. Id.at526.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.at527.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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satisfied, leading to the required conclusion that the mandatory arbitration clause did
not bar litigation of federal statutory claims. 0 2 Following this conclusion, the
Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's decision.0 3

V. COMMENT
Brisentine clarified the Eleventh Circuit's position and presented its
interpretation of the legal effect of Alexander in light of the Gilmer decision. Unlike
the Third and Fou-th Circuits,'O' the Eleventh Circuit decided Brisentine by
recognizing how Gilmer distinguished Alexander'0 5 with regard to collective
bargaining agreements not binding arbitration of federal statutory rights without
"casting Alexander upon the judicial mulch heap."' 6 Recognizing these distinctions,
Brisentine joined the majority of the circuits which have decided this issue by
adopting the Alexander line of precedent.'07 It also, however, hinted at the potential
for the Supreme Court making future changes within this area of the law. 08
The effect of this line of precedent is potentially both beneficial and
detrimental. At first glance, protecting individual employees from unions
collectively bargaining away their right to a judicial forum for federal statutory
claims appears beneficial." ° The reasoning behind this idea is the potential for a
large disparity between an employee's interest and the union's interest in pursuing
the statutory rights of an individual."0 Such "disparity weigh[s] against the
enforcement of arbitration clauses as the employee's exclusive remedy for individual
statutory rights.'
However, the precedent is detrimental because the union's lack
of this right causes much more litigation leading to clogged federal courts." 2
Logically, this leads to higher costs for businesses who pass these expenses to
customers by higher product prices.
In considering these issues, the Supreme Court used a balancing approach to
determine if individuals' federal statutory rights weighed heavier than other policy
issues."' 3 While this seems to be a logical outcome, the other line of precedent" 4
shows the Supreme Court is willing to bind individuals who knowingly waive their

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 74 and 75 and accompanying text.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 523.
See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
Id. This point is strongly supported by the Alexander line of authority.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
111. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
112. Between 1971 and 1991, federal court employment disputes increased twentyfold. Such an
increase is a 1000% greater than all types of other civil litigation combined. See Hope B. Eastman &
David M. Rothenstein, The Fate of Mandatory Employment Arbitration Amidst Growing Opposition:
A Callfor Common Ground, 20 EMP. REL. L.J. 595, 595 (1995).
113. Looking at Alexander and Gilmer, the Court is constantly weighing policy issues when trying
to reach decisions.
114. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
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rights to arbitrate federal statutory issues." 5 Even though the majority of circuits
follow the Alexander precedent when dealing with collective bargaining
agreements, 16 they are bound to do so.' However, it is clear the circuit courts do
so in anticipation of changes in the imminent future." 8 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has warmed considerably toward mandatory arbitration of federal statutory
rights since Alexander."9 In Mitsubishi, the court expressed the positive aspects of
the use of alternative dispute resolution. 2 ° These views were also embraced in
Gilmer. 2'
Accepting these views and predictions, it is not clear what approach the
Supreme Court may choose. One alternative would be to overrule Alexander and
supplant it with Gilmer's arbitration-friendly line of precedent. While this is
possible, it is doubtful considering the Court's focus in this line of cases on the
importance of weighing the tension between individual statutory rights and collective
bargaining representation being not applicable to Gilmer.'22 In light of this factor,
it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would be willing to modify Gilmer to include
this consideration.
The Court could also modify Alexander. Considering the tension between
individual statutory rights and collective representation, 23 the litigation overload,'24
the Court's friendlier attitude toward arbitration, 25 and additional costs such
litigation causes businesses and customers, the Court could choose to create an
arbitration-friendly version of Alexander. Such an approach would allow collective
bargaining agreements to require, as a first step, the arbitration of an individual's

115. Id.
116. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
117. The Brisentine court stated:
[Tihe Supreme Court has yet to address arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements in light of Gilmer. Unless and until it does so, the present case, a collective
bargaining agreement case like Alexander, is not distinguishable from Alexander on that
basis, either... It may be that the Supreme Court has cut Alexander back so far that it will
not survive. Perhaps, but we are not convinced we are authorized to sing the dirge of
Alexander. We will leave that to the Supreme Court[.]
Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 525; The PrynerCourt, a Seventh Circuit decision embracing the Alexander line
of precedent, stated:
On balance our case is closer to Alexander; but is enough left of Alexander to compel a
decision in favor of the plaintiffs? Only the Supreme Court can answer that question; and
we are timid about declaring decisions by the Supreme Court overruled when the Court has
not said so.
Pryner, 109 F.3d at 365.
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58. The Alexander Court expressed its opinion that arbitration,
while appropriate for resolving contractual issues, is inferior for resolving federal statutory issues. Id.
at 56.
120. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27. The Court stated, "[W]e are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." Id.
121. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34, n.5.
122. Id. at 35. This idea is consistently emphasized in the Alexander line of precedent, but the
Supreme Court stated that this tension was not an applicable concern in Gilmer. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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federal statutory rights. This arbitration, however, would not be binding, but would
probably encourage settlements since it would allow both sides to evaluate the claim
based on an arbitrator's decision. If the individual was unhappy with the decision,
she could then file her claim in federal court. If, however, she was willing to accept
the outcome of arbitration or agree to a settlement, she would waive her right to a
federal court action'26 subject to the terms of a drafted agreement. While such an
approach is not free from potential problems,' 27 it appears to offer a means of
reducing litigation and costs while still observing individual rights to statutory
claims.
Another approach would be to clarify and affirm how Gilmer distinguished
Alexander. If the Supreme Court, unlike the circuit courts, feels that Alexander is
strong and alive, it may choose to bring the Third 8 and Fourth 129 Circuits into line
with a future decision. However, the most likely approach of the Supreme Court will
be to continue to deny certiorari on this issue. This is likely because the split is
currently either four-to-two or four-to-one. 30 With most of the courts in unison and
with the strong policy of protecting individuals' federal statutory rights, the Court
is not likely to accept this issue for review unless more courts follow the Fourth
Circuit. Regardless of which approach the Supreme Court chooses, it is clear that
Brisentine followed the Alexander line of authority bringing the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals into line with the majority.

VI. CONCLUSION
While Brisentine had two separate lines of precedent to consider, the court
chose to apply the Alexander line of authority. With this choice, Brisentinejoined
the majority in concluding a union does not have the right to make collective
bargaining agreements that bind an individual's federal statutory claims to
arbitration. However, the court did recognize that Alexander had been substantially
limited by Gilmer, and the Supreme Court may in the near future change its
approach to collective bargaining agreements binding individuals' federal statutory
claims.
TROY GROAT

126. This would be nearly equivalent to the approach in Gilmer where individuals
are allowed to

knowingly waive their rights to litigate federal statutory issues. See supra notes
56-58 and accompanying
text. Of course, here it would be a postdispute instead ofpredispute agreement.
127. One might ask what benefits this approach provides since the parties would
have time to settle
before trial after considering discovery results regardless. This approach
would, however, provide an
opportunity to make an educated decision before spending money for formal
discovery and accordingly
would not require the court's time. A person may also ask how does this help
the employee. It provides
the opportunity for a faster, less expensive resolution. Of course, if the
matter goes to court, this
mandatory step would only have prolonged the process and added costs.
128. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

130. This is because the Third Circuit case was withdrawn and vacated.
position they may adopt. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it is unclear what
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